Too big has failed: President's message by Thomas M. Hoenig
wo  years  ago,  we  started  seeing  a 
problem  in  a  specialized  area  of 
financial  markets  that  many  people 
had  never  heard  of,  known  as  the 
subprime mortgage market.  At that time, most 
policymakers thought the problems would be 
self-contained and have limited impact on the 
broader economy.  Today, we know differently. 
We are in the midst of a very serious financial 
crisis,  and  our  economy  is  under  significant 
stress.
Over the past year, the federal government 
and  financial  policy  makers  have  enacted 
numerous  programs  and  committed  trillions 
of dollars of public funds to address the crisis.   
And still the problems remain. We have yet 
to restore confidence and transparency to the 
financial markets, leaving lenders and investors 
wary of making new commitments.  
The outcome so far, while disappointing, is 
perhaps not surprising.
We  have  been  slow  to  face  up  to  the 
fundamental problems in our financial system 
and  reluctant  to  take  decisive  action  with 
respect  to  failing  institutions. We  are  slowly 
beginning to deal with the overhang of problem 
assets and management weaknesses in some of 
our largest firms that this crisis is revealing. We 
have been quick to provide liquidity and public 
capital, but we have not defined a consistent 
plan  and  not  addressed  basic  shortcomings 
and, in some cases, the insolvent position of 
these institutions. 
We  understandably  would  prefer  not  to 
“nationalize” these businesses, but in reacting 
as  we  are,  we  nevertheless  are  drifting  into 
a  situation  where  institutions  are  being 
nationalized piecemeal with no resolution of 
the crisis.
With  conditions  de-
teriorating  around  us,  I 
will  offer  my  views  on 
how  we  might  yet  deal 
with  the  current  state  of 
affairs.    I’ll  start  with  a 
brief overview of the pol-
icy  actions  we  have  been 
pursuing,  but  I  will  also 
provide  perspective  on 
the actions we have taken 
and the outcomes we have 
experienced  in  previous 
financial crises.  Finally, I 
will  suggest  what  lessons 
we  might  take  from  these  previous  crises   
and apply to working our way out of the cur-
rent crisis.
In  suggesting  alternative  solutions,  I 
acknowledge it is no simple matter to solve. 
People say “it can’t be done” when speaking 
of  allowing  large  institutions  to  fail.  But  I 
don’t  think  that  those  who  managed  the 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation,  the 
Resolution  Trust  Corporation,  the  Swedish 
financial crisis or any other financial crisis were 
handed a blueprint that carried a guarantee of 
success. I don’t accept that we have lost our 
ability to solve a new problem, especially when 
it looks like a familiar problem.
Current policy actions  
and problems
Much has been written about how we got 
into our current situation, most notably the 
breakdowns in our mortgage finance system, 
weak or neglected risk management practices, 
and highly leveraged and interconnected firms 
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and financial markets. Because this has been 
well-documented,  today  I  will  focus  on  the 
policy responses we have tried so far and where 
they appear to be falling short. 
A wide range of policy steps has been taken 
to support financial institutions and improve 
the flow of credit to businesses and households.   
In  the  interest  of  time,  I  will  go  over  the   
list quickly.
As a means of providing liquidity to the 
financial system and the economy, the Federal 
Reserve has reduced the targeted federal funds 
rate in a series of steps from 5.25 percent at 
mid-year 2007 to the present 0 to 25 basis-
point range. In addition, the Federal Reserve 
has  instituted  a  wide  range  of  new  lending 
programs and, through its emergency lending 
powers,  has  extended  this  lending  beyond 
depository institutions.
The  Treasury  Department,  the  Federal 
Reserve and other regulators have also arranged 
bailouts  and  mergers  for  large  struggling 
or  insolvent  institutions,  including  Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns, WaMu, 
Wachovia,  AIG,  Countrywide,  and  Merrill 
Lynch.  But  other  firms,  such  as  Lehman 
Brothers, have been allowed to fail.
The Treasury  has  invested  public  funds, 
buying  preferred  stock  in  more  than  400 
financial  institutions  through  the  TARP 
program.   TARP  money  has  also  been  used 
to  fund  government  guarantees  of  more 
than $400 billion of securities held by major 
financial institutions, such as CitiGroup and 
Bank  of  America.  In  addition,  the  Federal 
Reserve  and  the  Treasury  Department  have 
committed more than $170 billion to bail out 
the troubled insurance company AIG.  
Other  actions  have  included  increased   
deposit  insurance  limits  and  guarantees  for   
bank  debt  instruments  and  money  market   
mutual funds.
The  most  recent  step  is  the  Treasury’s 
financial stability plan, which provides for a 
new round of TARP spending and controls, 
assistance  for  struggling  homeowners,  and 
a  plan  for  a  government/private  sector 
partnership  to  buy  up  bad  assets  held  by 
financial institutions and others.
The  sequence  of  these  actions, 
unfortunately,  has  added  to  market 
uncertainty.  Investors  are  understandably 
watching  to  see  which  institutions  will 
receive public money and survive as wards of   
the state.
Any  financial  crisis  leaves  a  stream  of   
losses  embedded  among  the  various   
participants, and these losses must ultimately 
be borne by someone.  To start the resolution 
process,  management  responsible  for  the 
problems  must  be  replaced  and  the  losses 
identified and taken. Until these kinds of actions 
are taken, there is little chance to restore market 
confidence and get credit markets flowing.  It 
is not a question of avoiding these losses, but 
one of how soon we will take them and get on 
to the process of recovery.  Economist Allan 
Meltzer  may  have  expressed  this  point  best 
when he said that “capitalism without failure is 
like religion without sin.”  
What might we learn from  
previous financial crises?
Many of the policy actions I just described 
provide  support  to  the  largest  financial 
institutions, those that are frequently referred 
to  as  “too  big  to  fail.”  A  rationale  for  such 
actions is that the failure of a large institution 
would have a systemic impact on the economy. 
It  is  emphasized  that  markets  have  become 
more  complex,  and  institutions—both  bank 
and  nonbank  entities  —are  now  larger  and 
connected more closely through a complicated set of relationships. Often, they point to the 
negative impact on the economy caused by last 
year’s failure of Lehman Brothers.  
History,  however,  may  show  us  another 
experience. When examining previous financial 
crises, in other countries as well as in the United 
States, large institutions have been allowed to 
fail. Banking authorities have been successful 
in placing new and more responsible managers 
and directors in charge and then reprivatizing 
them.  There  is  also  evidence  suggesting  that 
countries that have tried to avoid taking such 
steps have been much slower to recover, and 
the ultimate cost to taxpayers has been larger. 
There are several examples that illustrate 
these  points  and  show  what  has  worked  in 
previous crises and what hasn’t. A comparison 
that  many  are  starting  to  draw  now  is  with 
what happened in Japan and Sweden.
Japan  took  a  very  gradual  and  delayed 
approach  in  addressing  the  problems  in  its 
banks.  A series of limited steps spread out over 
a number of years were taken to slowly remove 
bad assets from the banks, and Japan put off 
efforts to address an even more fundamental 
problem  —a critical shortage of capital in these 
banks.  As a result, the banks were left in the 
position of having to focus on past problems 
with little resources available to help finance 
any economic recovery.
In contrast, Sweden took decisive steps to 
identify losses in its major financial institutions 
and  insisted  that  solvent  institutions  restore 
capital and clean up their balance sheets. The 
Swedish  government  did  provide  loans  to 
solvent institutions, but only if they also raised 
private capital. 
Sweden  dealt  firmly  with  insolvent 
institutions,  including  operating  two  of  the 
largest  banks  under  governmental  oversight 
with  the  goal  of  bringing  in  private  capital 
within a reasonable amount of time. To deal 
with  the  bad  assets  in  these  banks,  Sweden 
created  well-capitalized  asset  management 
corporations  or  what  we  might  call  “bad 
banks.” This step allowed the problem assets 
to be dealt with separately and systematically, 
while  other  banking  operations  continued 
under a transparent and focused framework.
The  end  result  of  this  approach  was  to   
restore  confidence  in  the  Swedish  banking 
system  in  a  timely  manner  and  limit  the 
amount  of  taxpayer  losses.  Sweden,  which 
experienced  a  real  estate  decline  more 
severe  than  that  in  the  United  States,  was 
able  to  resolve  its  banking  problems  at  a 
long  term  net  cost  of  less  than  2  percent   
of GDP. 
We can also learn a great deal from how 
the United States has dealt with previous crises.   
There has been a lot written attempting to draw 
parallels with the Great Depression. The main 
way that we dealt with struggling banks at that 
time was through the Reconstruction Finance   
Corporation.
Without  going  into  great  detail  about 
the RFC, I will note the four principles that 
Jesse Jones, the head of the RFC, employed in 
restructuring banks. The first step was to write 
down a bank’s bad assets to realistic economic 
values. Next, the RFC would judge the character 
and capacity of bank management and make 
any needed and appropriate changes.  The third 
step was to inject equity in the form of preferred 
stock, but this step did not occur until realistic 
asset values and capable management were in 
place. The final step was receiving the dividends 
and eventually recovering the par value of the 
stock as a bank returned to profitability and 
full private ownership.
At  one  point  in  1933,  the  RFC  held 
capital in more than 40 percent of all banks, 
representing  one-third  of  total  bank  capital 
according to some estimates, but because of the 
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out without any net cost to the government or 
to taxpayers. 
If  we  compare  the  TARP  program  to 
the RFC, TARP began without a clear set of 
principles and has proceeded with what seems 
to  be  an  ad  hoc  and  less-than-transparent 
approach  in  the  case  of  banks  judged  “too 
big  to  fail.”  In  both  the  RFC  and  Swedish 
experiences, triage was first used to set priorities 
and  determine  what  institutions  should  be 
addressed  immediately.  TARP  treated  the 
largest institutions as one. As we move forward 
from here, therefore, we would be wise to have 
a  systematic  set  of  principles  and  a  detailed 
plan to guide us.
Another  example  we  need  to  be  aware 
of  relates  to  the  thrift  problems  of  the 
1980s. Because the thrift insurance fund was 
inadequate  to  avoid  the  losses  embedded  in 
thrift balance sheets, an attempt was made to 
cover over the losses with net worth certificates 
and expanded powers that were supposed to 
allow  thrifts  to  grow  out  of  their  problems. 
A notable fraction of the thrift industry was 
insolvent,  but  continued  to  operate  as  so-
called “zombie” or “living dead” thrifts.  As you 
may recall, this attempt to postpone closing 
insolvent thrifts did not end well, but instead 
added greatly to the eventual losses and led to 
greater real estate problems.
A  final  example—our  approach  to  large 
bank problems in the 1980s and early 1990s 
—shows that we have taken some steps to deal 
with banking organizations that are considered 
“too  big  to  fail”  or  very  important  on  a   
regional level.
The  most  prominent  example  is   
Continental  Illinois’  failure  in  1984. 
Continental  was  the  seventh-largest  bank  in 
the country, the largest domestic commercial 
and  industrial  lender,  and  the  bank  that 
popularized  the  phrase  “too  big  to  fail.” 
Questions about Continental’s soundness led 
to a run by large foreign depositors in May   
of 1984.
But  looking  back,  Continental  actually 
was allowed to fail. Although the FDIC put 
together  an  open  bank  assistance  plan  and 
injected capital in the form of preferred stock, 
it also brought in new management at the top 
level, and shareholders, who were the bank’s 
owners, lost their entire investment. The FDIC 
also separated the problem assets from the bank, 
which left a clean bank to be restructured and 
eventually sold. To liquidate the bad assets, the 
FDIC hired specialists to oversee the different 
categories of loans and entered into a service 
agreement  with  Continental  that  provided 
incentive  compensation  for  its  staff  to  help 
with the liquidation process.  
A lesson to be drawn from Continental 
is that even large banks can be dealt with in 
a  manner  that  imposes  market  discipline 
on  management  and  stockholders,  while 
controlling taxpayer losses. The FDIC’s asset 
disposition  model  in  Continental,  which 
used incentive fees and contracts with outside 
specialists, also proved to be an effective and 
workable  model.  This  model  was  employed 
again in the failure of Bank of New England 
in 1991, the failures of nearly all of the large 
banking organizations in Texas in the 1980s, 
and also for the Resolution Trust Corporation, 
which was set up to liquidate failed thrifts.
Resolving the current crisis
Turning  to  the  current  crisis,  there  are   
several  lessons  we  can  draw  from  these  past 
experiences.  
• First, the losses in the financial system 
won’t  go  away—they  will  only  fester  and 
increase  while  impeding  our  chances  for   
a recovery.  
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and  specific  approach  to  major  institutions 
and their problems if we are to reduce market 
uncertainty and bring in private investors and 
market funding.  
• Third, if institutions—no matter what 
their  size—have  lost  market  confidence  and 
can’t survive on their own, we must be willing 
to  write  down  their  losses,  bring  in  capable 
management, sell off and reorganize misaligned 
activities and businesses, and begin the process 
of restoring them to private ownership.
How can we do this today in an era where 
we have to deal with systemic issues rising not 
only from very large banks, but also from many 
other segments of the marketplace?  I would be 
the first to acknowledge that some things have 
changed in our financial markets, but financial 
crises continue to occur for the same reasons 
as always—over-optimism, excessive debt and 
leverage ratios, and misguided incentives and 
perspectives—and our solutions must continue 
to address these basic problems.
The  process  we  use  for  failing  banks—
albeit far from perfect in dealing with “too big 
to fail” banks—provides some first insight into 
the principles we should establish in dealing 
with financial institutions of any type.
Our bank resolution framework focuses on 
timely action to protect depositors and other 
claimants, while limiting spillover effects to the 
economy.  Insured  depositors  at  failed  banks 
typically  gain  full  and  immediate  access  to 
their funds, while uninsured depositors often   
receive  quick,  partial  payouts  based  on   
expected recoveries.
To provide for a continuation of essential 
banking services, the FDIC may choose from 
a variety of options, including purchase and 
assumption  transactions,  deposit  transfers  or 
payouts,  bridge  banks,  conservatorships,  and 
open bank assistance. These options focus on 
transferring important banking functions over 
to sound banking organizations with capable 
management,  while  putting  shareholders  at 
failed banks first in line to absorb losses.
Other  important  features  in  resolving 
failing banks include an established priority for 
handling claimants, prompt corrective action, 
and least-cost resolution provisions to protect 
the  deposit  insurance  fund  and,  ultimately, 
taxpayers and to also bring as much market 
discipline to the process as possible.
I would argue for constructing a defined 
resolution program for “too big to fail” banks 
and  bank  holding  companies,  and  nonbank 
financial institutions. It is especially necessary 
in cases where the normal bankruptcy process 
may  be  too  slow  or  disruptive  to  financial 
market  activities  and  relationships.  The 
program  and  resolution  process  should  be 
implemented on a consistent, transparent and 
equitable basis whether we are resolving small 
banks, large banks or other complex financial 
entities.  
How should we structure this resolution 
process?  While  a  number  of  details  would 
need to be worked out, let me provide a broad 
outline of how it might be done.
First, public authorities would be directed 
to  declare  any  financial  institution  insolvent 
whenever its capital level falls too low to support 
its ongoing operations and the claims against 
it, or whenever the market loses confidence in 
the firm and refuses to provide funding and 
capital. This directive should be clearly stated 
and  consistently  adhered  to  for  all  financial 
institutions that are part of the intermediation 
process  or  payments  system.  We  must  also 
recognize up front that the FDIC’s resources 
and other financial industry support funds may 
not always be sufficient for this task and that 
Treasury money may also be needed.
Next,  public  authorities  should  use 
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powers  to  take  over  the  failing  institution 
and  continue  its  operations  under  new 
management.  Following  what  we  have  done 
with  banks,  a  receiver  would  then  take  out 
all or a portion of the bad assets, and either 
sell the remaining operations to one or more 
sound financial institutions or arrange for the 
operations to continue on a bridge basis under 
new management and professional oversight.   
In the case of larger institutions with complex 
operations, such bridge operations would need 
to continue until a plan can be carried out for 
cleaning  up  and  restructuring  the  firm  and 
then reprivatizing it.
Shareholders  would  be  forced  to  bear 
the full risk of the positions they have taken 
and  suffer  the  resulting  losses.  The  newly 
restructured  institution  would  continue 
the  essential  services  and  operations  of  the   
failing firm.  
All existing obligations would be addressed 
and dealt with according to whatever priority 
is set up for handling claims. This could go 
so far as providing 100 percent guarantees to 
all liabilities, or, alternatively, it could include 
resolving short-term claims expeditiously and, 
in the case of uninsured claims, giving access 
to  maturing  funds  with  the  potential  for 
haircuts depending on expected recoveries, any 
collateral protection and likely market impact.
There is legitimate concern for addressing 
these issues when institutions have significant 
foreign operations. However, if all liabilities are 
guaranteed, for example, and the institution is 
in receivership, such international complexities 
could be addressed satisfactorily. 
One  other  point  in  resolving  “too  big 
to fail” institutions is that public authorities 
should take care not to worsen our exposure 
to such institutions going forward. In fact, for 
failed institutions that have proven to be too 
big or too complex to manage well, steps must 
be taken to break up their operations and sell 
them off in more manageable pieces. We must 
also look for other ways to limit the creation 
and growth of firms that might be considered 
“too big to fail.”
In this regard, our recent experience with 
ad hoc solutions to large failing firms has led 
to even more concentrated financial markets as 
only the largest institutions are likely to have 
the  available  resources  for  the  type  of  hasty 
takeovers that have occurred. Another drawback 
is  that  these  organizations  do  not  have  the 
time for necessary “due diligence” assessments 
and, as we have seen, may encounter serious 
acquisition  problems.  Under  a  more  orderly 
resolution  process,  public  authorities  would 
have the time to be more selective and bring 
in a wider group of bidders, and they would be 
able to offer all or portions of institutions that 
have been restored to sound conditions.
Concluding thoughts  
While  hardly  painless  and  with  much 
complexity itself, this approach to addressing 
“too big to fail” strikes me as constructive and 
as  having  a  proven  track  record.  Moreover, 
the current path is beset by ad hoc decision 
making and the potential for much political 
interference, including efforts to force problem 
institutions to lend if they accept public funds; 
operate  under  other  imposed  controls;  and 
limit management pay, bonuses and severance.   
If  an  institution’s  management  has   
failed  the  test  of  the  marketplace,  these   
managers  should  be  replaced.  They  should 
not  be  given  public  funds  and  then   
micro-managed, as we are now doing under 
TARP, with a set of political strings attached. 
Many are now beginning to criticize the 
idea  of  public  authorities  taking  over  large 
institutions on the grounds that we would be 
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that  this  is  a  misnomer,  as  we  are  taking  a 
temporary step that is aimed at cleaning up 
a  limited  number  of  failed  institutions  and 
returning them to private ownership as soon 
as possible. This is something that the banking 
agencies  have  done  many  times  before  with 
smaller institutions and, in selected cases, with 
very large institutions. In many ways, it is also 
similar to what is typically done in a bankruptcy 
court,  but  with  an  emphasis  on  ensuring  a 
continuity  of  services.  In  contrast,  what  we 
have been doing so far is every bit a process 
that results in a protracted nationalization of 
“too big to fail” institutions.   
The  issue  that  we  should  be  most 
concerned about is what approach will produce 
consistent and equitable outcomes and will get 
us back on the path to recovery in the quickest 
manner and at reasonable cost. While it may 
take us some time to clean up and reprivatize a 
large institution in today’s environment—and I 
do not intend to underestimate the difficulties 
that would be encountered—the alternative of 
leaving an institution to continue its operations 
with  a  failed  management  team  in  place  is 
certain to be more costly and far less likely to 
produce a desirable outcome.
In a similar fashion, some are now claiming 
that public authorities do not have the expertise 
and capacity to take over and run a “too big 
to  fail”  institution.  They  contend  that  such 
takeovers would destroy a firm’s inherent value, 
give talented employees a reason to leave, cause 
further financial panic and require many years 
for the restructuring process. We should ask, 
though, why would anyone assume we are better 
off leaving an institution under the control of 
failing managers, dealing with the large volume 
of “toxic” assets they created and coping with a 
raft of politically imposed controls that would 
be placed on their operations?
In contrast, a firm resolution process could 
be placed under the oversight of independent 
regulatory  agencies  whenever  possible  and 
ideally would be funded through a combination 
of Treasury and financial industry funds.
Furthermore,  the  experience  of  the 
banking  agencies  in  dealing  with  significant 
failures indicates that financial regulators are 
capable of bringing in qualified management 
and  specialized  expertise  to  restore  failing 
institutions to sound health. This rebuilding 
process thus provides a means of restoring value 
to  an  institution,  while  creating  the  type  of 
stable environment necessary to maintain and 
attract talented employees. Regulatory agencies 
also  have  a  proven  track  record  in  handling 
large volumes of problem assets—a record that 
helps to ensure that resolutions are handled in 
a way that best protects public funds.
Finally,  I  would  argue  that  creating  a 
framework  that  can  handle  the  failure  of 
institutions of any size will restore an important 
element of market discipline to our financial 
system, limit moral hazard concerns, and assure 
the fairness of treatment from the smallest to the 
largest organizations that is the hallmark of our   
economic system.
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